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Title VII Seniority Remedies in a Time
of Economic Downturn*
Donald R. Stacy**
The current economic downturn in the United States, charac-
terized by a deceleration in economic growth and, more recently, a
recession,' has occasioned or exposed problems of employment dis-
crimination in seniority systems that prior court decisions do not
resolve. Rules laid down by the federal courts or by the federal
government's two administrative guardians against discrimination
in employment-the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(E.E.O.C.)2 and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance
(O.F.C.C.) 3 -are not the general solutions that they had earlier ap-
peared to be. Instead, in an economic downturn the rules have
served to exacerbate discriminatory practices or to delay remedies.
The riddle of how to comply with equal-opportunity require-
ments in imposing a layoff has prompted a flurry of lawsuits,4 lead
articles in the New York Times5 and the Wall Street Journal,, and
an increasingly visible divergence in policy between the E.E.O.C.
and the O.F.C.C.7 Indicative of the present confusion is a suit
brought by an employer in New Jersey against the E.E.O.C. and the
* The views here expressed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
**Regional Counsel, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission; Adjunct Professor,
University of Georgia Law School. B.A. 1961, Millsaps College, M.A. 1963, Vanderbilt Uni-
versity, J.D. 1967, University of Mississippi, LL.M. 1968, Yale University. The writer wishes
to express his appreciation to Floyd Hale, Ray Terry, Patricia Eames, Robert Covington and
Mike McGee for their review of the manuscript and many helpful suggestions.
1. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BusiNEss, Table 1.2-Gross National
Product in Constant Dollars, at 12 (Nov. 1974).
2. Established under the authority of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1970).
3. Established under the authority of Exec. Order No. 11,246 (1965), 3 C.F.R. 169
(1974).
4. Bales v. General Motors Corp., 9 F.E.P. Cas. 234 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Jersey Cent.
Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, Electrical Workers, 8 F.E.P. Cas. 690 (D.N.J. 1974), rev'd,
508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975); Cox v. Allied Chem. Corp., 382 F. Supp. 309 (M.D. La. 1974);
Loy v. City of Cleveland, 8 F.E.P. Cas. 614, dismissed as moot, 8 F.E.P. Cas. 617 (N.D. Ohio
1974); Watkins v. Local 2639, Steelworkers, 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La. 1974), appeal dock-
eted, No. 74-2604, 5th Cir., June 17, 1974; Cates v. TWA, Inc., 8 E.P.D. $ 9755 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); United Affirmative Action Comm. v. Gleason, 10 F.E.P. Cas. 64 (D. Ore. 1974); Roman
v. ESB, Inc., 368 F. Supp. 47 (D.S.C. 1973); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 8 F.E.P. Cas.
235 (N.D. IIl. 1973), rev'd, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W.
3476 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1975).
5. N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1974, § 3, at 1, col. 1.
6. Wall Street J., Nov. 5, 1974, at 1, col. 6.
7. See textual discussion accompanying notes 173-75 infra.
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O.F.C.C. to determine its legal obligations in imposing a layoff.8 In
addition, cases dealing with seniority and layoffs have been decided
by the Seventh9 and Third'0 Circuits and another is pending in the
Fifth Circuit," all of which will likely require ultimate resolution by
the Supreme Court.
This article will attempt to clarify the application of rules
against employment discrimination in a period of rising unemploy-
ment by first examining the nature of the seniority system and then
explaining the theory and mechanism of the conventional remedy.
Next a review of recent problems that have tefted that remedy will
be undertaken, with special attention devoted to the peculiar prob-
lems incident to layoffs. Lastly, the article will consider the means
by which an employer can minimize the liability that may result
from the discriminatory impact of seniority systems.
I. THE NATURE OF THE SENIoRITY SYSTEM
With unemployment at a thirty-four-year high,' 2 it is relevant
to recall that organized labor's commitment to the seniority princi-
ple arose from anxiety about job tenure.'3 In periods of fuller em-
ployment, workers came to regard the seniority principle as a useful
device limiting management's power to control job movements,
thereby enabling employees better to assess their prospects for re-
tention and advancement. 4 In addition, union leaders saw that the
seniority principle would deliver them from the turmoil implicit in
8. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, Electrical Workers, 8 F.E.P. Cas. 690
(D.N.J. 1974), vacated, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975).
9. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974).
10. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, Electrical Workers, 508 F.2d 687 (3d
Cir. 1975).
11. Watkins v. Local 2639, Steelworkers, appeal docketed No. 74-2604 (5th Cir. June
17, 1974).
12. Wall Street J., Feb. 10, 1975, at 3, col. 1.
13. "Seniority first emerged in the railroad industry of the '80's, in an atmosphere of
stratified opportunity and precarious tenure. The growth of vast and complex railroad organi-
zations and of absentee ownership militated against recognition of merit. And several factors
combined to make employment insecure. Not only were nepotism and job-selling rife, but also
it was the customary practice for superintendents, in their frequent shifts from road to road,
to transfer employees who ousted the incumbents of the lower positions." Comment, Seniority
Rights in Labor Relations, 47 YALm L.J. 73,74 (1937) (footnotes omitted). Somewhat similar
apprehension prompted federal and municipal legislation adopting seniority as the basis for
retention when reductions in the civil service are made. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 3502 (1970). See also
Loy v. City of Cleveland, 8 F.E.P. Cas. 614, 615 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
14. Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws, 82 HARv. L.
REV. 1598, 1605 (1969); Note, Title VI, Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro,
80 HARv. L. REV. 1260, 1263 (1967).
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having to choose among individual workers' competing claims on
the basis of merit. 5
Management sees the seniority principle as counterproductive
when applied to either job assignment or workforce retrenchment.
In management's view the assignment of employees should be based
upon merit and ability rather than seniority, except when the quali-
fications of the employees are relatively equal. Promotions or trans-
fers based only upon seniority may stifle individual employee initia-
tive and impair both the efficiency of operations and the competi-
tive position of the company. Managerial discretion in such actions
ensures the matching of employees with the tasks for which they are
best suited and facilitates the hiring and retention of skilled work-
ers, who often refuse to start at the bottom of the wage ladder. 6 In
layoff situations management would prefer to minimize the retrain-
ing, transfers and "bumping" of junior employees implicit in a sen-
iority system by dispensing first with those least qualified to per-
form the remaining work. 17
Whatever values it may serve or disserve, however, the seniority
principle is now embodied in virtually every collective bargaining
agreement."8 The magnitude of this principle is demonstrated by the
latest published figures, an estimated 26,000,000 employees are cov-
ered by collective bargaining agreements. 9
Analytically, it is useful to dichotomize the concept of seniority
in order better to understand the functions that it performs. "Com-
petitive status seniority"20 is the type of seniority with which this
article is more concerned, and applies in those situations in which
the granting of a certain benefit to one aspiring employee necessi-
tates the denial of it to all other contending employees. For exam-
ple, although changes in technology or scope of operations might
enable all aspirants to be promoted to foreman in the long run, in
the short run awarding the job to one aspirant means denying it to
all others. This type of seniority is to be distinguished from "fringe
15. Gould, Black Workers Inside the House of Labor, 407 ANNALS 78, 82-83 (1973).
16. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS: SENIORITY IN PROMOTION AND TRANsFE PROVISIONS 1 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as PROMOTION AND TRANSFER].
17. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS: LAYOFF, RECALL AND WORKSHARING PROCEDURES 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
LAYOFF, RECALL].
18. Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75
HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1534 (1962).
19. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DIRECTORY OF NATIONAL UNIONS
AND EMPLOYEE ASSoCIATIONS, 1973, at 88 (1974).
20. S. SucHTER, J. HEALY & E. LIVERNASH, THE IMPACT OF CoLLECTIvE BARGAINING ON
MANAGEMENT 106 (1960) [hereinafter cited as IMPACT].
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benefit seniority," which governs the enjoyment of noncompetitive
entitlements such as pension benefits and increments in vacation
time.2'
Included among the benefits, options, and safeguards affected
by competitive status seniority, are not only promotion 22 and lay-
off,23 but also transfer,24 demotion, 25 rest days, 2 shift assignments,2
prerogative in scheduling vacation,2 order of layoff,2 possibilities of
lateral transfer to avoid layoff,3" "bumping" possibilities in the face
of layoff,3' order of recall,3 2 training opportunities, 33 working condi-
tions, 34 length of layoff endured without reducing seniority, 35 length
of layoff recall rights will withstand, 36 overtime opportunities, 31
parking privileges, 38 and, in one plant, a preferred place in the
punch-out line.39 The impact of seniority varies in each of the
competive situations listed above. While management may be
wholly content, indeed relieved, to assign parking spaces on the
basis of seniority, countervailing considerations of skill and ability
seem extremely significant in promotions.
A thorough, recent study of some 1,851 major 0 collective bar-
gaining agreements found promotion-on-seniority-only clauses in
only three percent of the agreements having seniority provisions.'
A mere textual examination of collective bargaining agreements,
21. Note, Title VII, supra note 14, at 1263 n.23.
22. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENTS: ADMINISTRATION OF SENIoRTrY 2 (1970) [hereinafter cited as ADMINISTRATION OF
SENIORITY].
23. Fluker v. Locals 265 & 940, Papermakers, 6 E.P.D. 8807 (S.D. Ala. 1972).
24. ADMINISTRATION OF SENIORITY, supra note 22, at 2 (1970).
25. Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 321 F. Supp. 1241, 1242 (E.D. La. 1971).
26. IMPACT, supra note 20, at 108.
27. Id. at 107-08.
28. United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 359 (8th Cir. 1973).
29. Id. BNA's newly revised Basic Patterns in Union Contracts reveals that, in a sample
of 400 contracts in effect in 1973, seniority was a factor in selecting employees for layoff in
85% of the contracts. BNA, Daily Labor Report, Jan. 23, 1975, B-1.
30. LAYOFF, RECALL, supra note 17, at 37.
31. Id. at 39.
32. United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 359 (8th Cir. 1973).
33. Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 321 F. Supp. 1241, 1242-43 (E.D. La. 1971).
34. IMPACT, supra note 20, at 107.
35. Buckner v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 339 F. Supp. 1108, 1120 (N.D. Ala. 1972),
aff'd. mem., 476 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir. 1973).
36. Watkins v. Local 2369, Steelworkers, 8 F.E.P. Cas. 729, 731 (E.D. La. 1974).
37. ADMINISTRATION OF SENIORITY, supra note 22, at 2.
38. IMPACT, supra note 20, at 109.
39. Id. at 109 n.1.
40. As here employed, major collective bargaining agreements are defined as those
covering 1000 or more workers. PROMOTION AND TRANSFER, supra note 16, at iii.
41. Id. at 5.
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however, may leave one overly impressed by the skill or ability
requirements that appear in unweighted juxtaposition with the sen-
iority element. Unwritten employee expectations often impose a
potent interpretive gloss. For example, in a strongly unionized in-
dustry a junior employee cannot be promoted over a senior worker
unless he is "head and shoulders" better than his competitor.2
A further, severely restrictive impediment to mobility is the
accrual of seniority on a less than plant-wide basis. "Job," "gang,"
"unit," "progression line," or "department" seniority is frequently
a basis for determining promotion. 3 Although these subdivided sen-
iority systems may reflect the efficiencies of specialization, foster
professionalism, and avoid the personnel costs involved in a plant-
wide canvass, they foreclose the lateral entry of long-time employees
from elsewhere in the plant by denying credit to their seniority, thus
relegating veteran employees to entry-level pay and perquisites.
This barrier to transfer is objectionable to both the employees in a
department where specialized output is in declining demand and to
the ambitious employee who finds those with greater departmental
seniority to be uncommonly settled.
If these employees have been relegated to a less desirable de-
partment on the basis of their sex,44 race,45 or nationality,46 then
what ordinarily would be merely vexatious becomes invidious, and
the employees feel compelled to seek a remedy. Furthermore, the
option of collectively organizing on the basis of sex, race, or nation-
ality to negotiate for lateral mobility is foreclosed when a union
already serves as collective bargaining agent.47 A certified union
enjoys a monopoly within the bargaining unit since the employer is
42. Gould, Black Workers Inside the House of Labor, 407 ANNAiS 78, 83 (1973). See also
Taylor v. Armco Steel Corp., 373 F. Supp. 885 (S.D. Tex. 1973): "Under the contract seniority
is only one of three criteria. Ability and physical fitness are the others. . . . However, the
evidence from all parties was clear that the men and the Union regarded seniority as the
controlling factor and required Armco to go to great lengths to show that a man was unable
or unfit." 373 F. Supp. at 906, n.7.
43. Irvin v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 308 F. Supp. 152, 161 (E.D. Ark. 1970); United States
v. Local 189, Papermakers, 282 F. Supp. 39, 42 (E.D. La. 1968); Quarles v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 512 (E.D. Va. 1968).
44. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969); Laffey v. North-
west Airlines, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 763 (D.D.C. 1973); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 293 F.
Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
45. United States v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 6 F.E.P. Cas. 274 (C.D. Cal. 1973);
United States v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 6 F.E.P. Cas. 280 (M.D.N.C. 1973); United
States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 532 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
46. Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 6 F.E.P. Cas. 939 (D. Ariz. 1973); United States v. Navajo
Freight Lines, Inc., 6 F.E.P. Cas. 274 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
47. Emporium Catwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 95 S. Ct.
977 (1975). See generally R. MARSHALL, THE NEGRO AND ORGANIZED LABOR 242, 244 (1965).
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prohibited by statute from negotiating with anyone but the union
representative concerning terms and conditions of employment."
Nevertheless, the same status of statutory monopoly that occasions
this exclusivity also raises the possibility that the actions of the
monopoly are amenable to legal regulation.
II. THEORY AND MECHANISM OF THE CONVENTIONAL REMEDY
A. Legislative and Decisional Attempts to Deal with Seniority and
Discrimination
Only nine months after the Supreme Court first articulated the
basic rule of exclusive representation,49 now a cornerstone of our
national labor policy, the Court was constrained, to spell out the
correlative obligation of the union not to discriminate in its repre-
sentation of those within the bargaining unit. In Steele v. Louisville
& Nashville R.R.,11 an all-white union with a substantial number of
blacks in its bargaining unit negotiated a collective bargaining
agreement providing that: "not more than 50% of the firemen in
each class of service in each seniority district of a carrier should be
negroes. . . . -., The Court voided the agreement, holding that the
union was required "to represent non-union or minority union mem-
bers of the craft without hostile discrimination .... ,,52
The Steele doctrine of "fair representation" forbids unions from
entering into agreements that invidiously discriminate against mi-
norities. Although its prohibitory impact is clear, there is doubt,
however, whether the doctrine implicitly contains an affirmative
duty to rectify the competitive disadvantage that is brought to a
seniority system by prior discrimination.5 3 The most significant liti-
gative effort to impose this implicit obligation was undertaken in
Whitfield v. Steelworkers Local 270811 in the Fifth Circuit in the late
fifties. From 1942 until a 1956 collective bargaining agreement,
black employees at a Houston steel mill had been foreclosed from
entering the more remunerative, skilled line of progression. The
collective bargaining agreement offered only a partial remedy:
blacks were no longer barred from entering the skilled line of pro-
48. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970); 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1970).
49. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
50. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
51. Id. at 195.
52. Id. at 204.
53. Archibald Cox, for example, has argued that the duty of fair representation does
not impose upon unions "the affirmative obligation of making reasonable efforts to abolish
racial discrimination." Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 ViLL. L. REV. 151, 156-57
(1957).
54. 263 F.2d 546 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959).
[Vol. 28
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gression, but those who entered did so like all other transferees
across department lines-bereft of any recognition of their seniority
and with a pay cut to entry-grade level. 5 Five black employees sued
the union, as their exclusive bargaining agent, for failing in the
performance of its concomitant duty of "fair representation." The
trial court held against plaintiffs" and the appellate court affirmed,
noting: "We might not agree with every provision, but they have a
contract that from now on is free from any discrimination based on
race. Angels could do no more."57
The Whitfield decision was considered to be the conventional
wisdom by the forces who in the early sixties successfully pressed
for the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Perhaps to insulate the
workings of the seniority principle from attack in the name of anti-
discrimination, Congress tempered the thrust of Title VII, the em-
ployment discrimination title, by adopting section 703(h) of the
Dirksen-Mansfield substitute, which, in relevant part, exempted
from the Title's prohibitions "different standards of compensation,
or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant
to a bona fide seniority . . . system . . .,.5
Some fifty days before the Senate received the Dirksen-
Mansfield substitute bill that it subsequently adopted, Senate floor
leaders Clark and Case sought to allay apprehensions for seniority
systems under Title VII in language to which the courts have repeat-
edly turned:
Title VII would have no effect on established seniority rights. Its effect is
prospective and not retrospective. Thus, for example, if a business has been
discriminating in the past and as a result has an all white working force, when
the Title comes into effect the employer's obligation would be simply to fill
future vacancies on a nondiscriminatory basis. He would not be obliged-or
indeed, permitted-to fire whites in order to hire for future vacancies, or, once
Negroes are hired, to give them special seniority rights at the expense of the
white worker hired earlier.5'
55. 263 F.2d at 549.
56. Whitfield v. Local 2708, Steelworkers, 156 F. Supp. 430 (S.D. Tex. 1957).
57. 263 F.2d at 551.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). Ruefully, the term "bona fide" is not defined in the statute.
The concept does not include all seniority systems that are the product of strenuous but
uncoerced bargaining. For example, such a departmental seniority system that favored a
junior white over a senior black employee was found not to be bona fide in Quarles v. Philip
Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968). Plant-wide seniority systems may be immune
from similar scrutiny as to their effect. The view of the Third and Seventh Circuit Courts of
Appeals is that a plant-wide seniority system qualifying for the statutory exemption of §
703(h) as bona fide can produce racially or sexually disproportionate layoffs which respondent
employer or union does not have to justify in terms of business necessity. Contrast Jersey
Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, IBEW, 9 F.E.P. Cas. 117 (3d Cir. 1975) with Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
59. 110 CONG. REc. 7213 (Apr. 8, 1964).
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Hypothesizing about layoffs, the Senate floor leaders explained:
If, for example, a collective bargaining contract provides that in the event of
layoffs, those who were hired last must be laid off first, such a provision would
not be affected in the least by Title VII. This would be true even in the case,
where, owing to discrimination prior to the effective date of the title, white
workers had more seniority than Negroes. Title VII is directed at discrimina-
tion based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin. It is perfectly clear
that when a worker is laid off or denied a chance for promotion because under
established seniority rules he is low man on the totem pole he is not being
discriminated against because of his race. 0
Sections 703(h) and 7030)1 and the quoted analysis offered by
Senate floor leaders Clark and Case are the determinants with
which courts have dealt in weighing seniority systems under Title
VII. Soon after the legislation's enactment the courts were asked to
consider whether, under Title VII, it was sufficient for a company
with a formerly discriminatory seniority system (i.e., one in which
race, sex, or national origin determined departmental or
progression-line assignment) simply to desist from actively discrim-
inating "from now on," in the words of Whitfield.
The Fifth Circuit provided the landmark treatment of this
question in United States v. Papermakers Local 189,2 which dealt
with the historically segregated progression lines of a southern
Louisiana paper mill. The court held that the facially neutral re-
60. Id. at 7207.
61. The Dirksen-Mansfield substitute, which was the source of § 703(h), was also the
source of the more problematically worded anti-preference provision, § 703(j), set out below
and more fully discussed in the text accompanying note 194 infra.
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer,
employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee subject
to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group
because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on
account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage
of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer,
referred or classified for employment by any employment agency or labor organization,
admitted to membership or classified by any labor organization, or admitted to, or
employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program, in comparison with the total
number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in
any community, State, section, or other area, or in the available work force in any
community, State, section, or other area.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970). See generally Note, Employment Discrimination: Statistics
and Preferences Under Title VII, 59 VA. L. Rav. 463 (1973). Compare the position taken by
the Solicitor General at page 7 of the amicus brief filed by the Justice Department and the
E.E.O.C. in support of the granting of certiorari in Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., No. 74-
728, cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3515 (U.S. Mar. 24, 1975): "Section 703(j) of the Act ... is
not a bar to an award of seniority credit. That Section addresses only what constitutes an
unlawful employment practice; it does not limit the court's remedial power to prescribe
effective relief once a violation is established."
62. Local 189, Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 919 (1970).
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quirement of forfeiture of competitive-status seniority upon transfer
between progression lines revived past wrongs and violated Title
VII. The practical result had been that long-employed blacks could
enter the more remunerative, and formerly all-white, line of progres-
sion only at the bottom, possibly at a reduced salary and certainly
without any recognition of competitive-status seniority. 3
The court's opinion also contains a lengthy and oft-cited weigh-
ing of the competing theories for bringing seniority systems into
compliance with Title VILV4 The court examined three theories:
(1) the "freedom now" theory, essentially a complete purge of
the "but-for" effects of previous bias, that would require that
blacks displace white incumbents who hold jobs that, but for
discrimination, the blacks' greater plant seniority would entitle
them to hold;
(2) the "rightful place" theory which construed Title VII to
prohibit the future awarding of vacant jobs on the basis of a
seniority system that "locks in" prior racial classification; and,
(3) the "status quo" theory, reminiscent of Whitfield, under
which the employer could satisfy the requirements of Title VII
merely by ending existing discrimination.65
The court found the "rightful place" theory best to comport with
the legislative history and affirmed the judgment of the district
court.
The Local 189 court directed that workers in the black progres-
sion line be allowed to carry over their competitive-status seniority
upon transfer to the previously all-white progression line and use it
in bidding on future vacancies in that line.66 In dictum, the court
stated further that it was simply requiring that time actually
worked in black jobs be given equal status with time worked in
63. 416 F.2d at 990. An even more severe variant of departmental seniority obtained
throughout the trucking industry. Minority employees were hired only as city drivers, usually
a separate bargaining unit from that for the more remunerative over-the-road drivers. The
facially neutral requirement of the collective bargaining agreement was that a city driver had
first to resign and then to apply as a new employee. Against such a background the ostensibly
neutral practice was found to perpetuate discrimination. As a remedial measure city drivers
were allowed to transfer to over-the-road jobs with all seniority exceeding the minimum
experience requirement. Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1973); Sabala
v. Western Gillette, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 385 (S.D. Tex. 1974); United States v. Navajo Freight
Lines, Inc., 6 F.E.P. Cas. 274 (C.D. Cal. 1973). See generally, J. NELSON, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY
IN TRUCKING: AN INDUSTRY AT THE CROSSROADS (1971).
64. The court borrowed on the analysis of a seminal law review note entitled Title VII,
Seniority Discrimination and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1260 (1967).
65. 416 F.2d at 988.
66. Id. at 992-94.
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white jobs. It deprecated the creation of fictional seniority for blacks
not previously hired, declaring this practice to be "preferential
treatment on the basis of race" forbidden by section 703(j).1
The E-E.O.C. has made note of its disagreement with the Local
189 denial of a remedy to blacks not previously hired. Commission
Decision 71-1447 states that those who were refused employment or
dissuaded from applying by a company's segregationist reputation
have suffered complete discrimination, in contrast to the only par-
tial discrimination suffered by those employed in the segregated
departments. Therefore, the Commission declared, the remedial
purposes of Title VII are poorly "effectuated by basing a difference
in legal consequence upon the thoroughness of the discrimination."68
The type of order affirmed in Local 189 causes little, if any,
disruption of industry. It preserves the basic values of a seniority
system while enabling those formerly excluded to move more
quickly into higher level positions by virtue of carried-over senior-
ity. 9 Although, as discussed in the next section of this article, Local
189 is now controverted in a half dozen of its implications, it re-
mains the beginning case for many Title VII string citations.
Though the transfer of seniority remedy decreed in Local 189,
has been successively endorsed by every appellate court that has
considered the question,7" the administration of the remedy has
been bedeviled by problems. It is to those problems that the article
next turns.
B. The Search for the Dysfunction-free Remedial Order
The carry-over of antecedent seniority need not be granted to
every employee; it is compelled only for victims of prior discrimina-
tion, dubbed by the courts to be members of the "affected class."
67. 416 F.2d at 995.
68. EEOC Decision No. 71-1447, CCH EEOC Decisions 6217, at 4375-76 & n.10
(1971).
69. See Cooper, Introduction: Equal Employment Law Today, 5 COLUM. HUM. RIGHTS
L. REv. 263, 269 (1973). Labor unions have seized upon efforts to remedy departmental
seniority's potential for perpetuating discrimination as an opportunity to press for plant-wide
seniority for all. This is doubly attractive to union officials since it broadens the promotion
and transfer options for all workers and avoids the disgruntlement felt by white male workers
when plant-wide seniority comes into play only at the intervention of a member of the
affected class. The courts have not held so sweeping a change to be required, e.g., Bragg v.
Robertshaw Controls Co., 355 F. Supp. 345 (E.D. Tenn. 1972), though it was successfully
negotiated for in the consent decree entered in the steel industry litigation. See 8 BNA 1974
LAB. REL. REP., F.E.P. MANUAL § 431 at 125, 133 (1974).
70. See Bowe v. Colgate, Palmolive Co., 489 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v.
N.L. Indus. Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th
Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); United States v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2nd Cir. 1971).
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Although the gravamen of an attack on the seniority forfeiture pro-
vision may be its inhibition of minority transfer, the affected class
clearly includes those who already have transferred, incurring the
loss, as well as those inhibited from transfer. 7' On the other hand,
the affected class is not necessarily that described by plaintiffs in
the class action paragraph of their complaint, 72 nor does it extend
to those hired after discrimination has ceased. 73
Once those deserving antecedent seniority are identified, the
inquiry ought to move to how they should be informed of the oppor-
tunities for its use. The most prevalent method is the posting of
vacancies.74 If the jobs in a more desirable department from which
women or minorities were heretofore excluded are dictated by the
technology of the industry to be vertically linked so that the experi-
ence prerequisite for a higher position can only be met by incum-
bency in the next lower position, then only entry-level vacancies are
open to the affected class.75 If, however, the vertical linkage is as-
cribable to custom and not to technological necessity, then pros-
pects for advanced entry are open, and the remedy requires that the
affected class members have notice of these vacancies as well. 71 The
minimal requirement is that relevant notices of vacancy must be
communicated to the affected class contemporaneously with notice
to others. 77 Courts have, in their discretion, ordered orientation or
familiarization tours, so as to provide members of the affected class
with actual knowledge of the nature of the vacant position. 71
71. See United States v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 464 F.2d 301, 311 (8th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1107, 1116 (1973); Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 385, 390
(S.D. Tex. 1974); Irvin v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 308 F. Supp. 152, 161 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
72. See, e.g., Dennis v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 5 E.P.D. 8599 (D.S.C. 1973); McA-
dory v. Scientific Instruments, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 468 (D. Md. 1973); O'Brien v. Shimp, 356
F. Supp. 1259 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
73. See, e.g., United States v. Florida East Coast Ry., 7 F.E.P. Cas. 540, 555-56 (M.D.
Fla. 1974). Though this rule seems simple, it has been misapplied to foreclose class member-
ship to blacks hired after the assignment of just one white to a previously all-black depart-
ment. E.g., Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 349 F. Supp. 3, 16 (S.D. Tex. 1972),
modified, 491 F.2d 1364, 1374 (5th Cir. 1974). The entry of whites or males into a department
does not cure the discrimination where minority or female workers are still assigned only to
that department. In Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971), the job of city driver was still, under this analysis, a black job
though 80% of the incumbents were white.
74. See PROMOTION AND TRANsFER, supra note 16, at 15-18.
75. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974); Long v.
Georgia Kraft Co., 450 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1971).
76. Bush v. Lone Star Steel Co., 373 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Tex. 1974).
77. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 248 (5th Cir. 1974);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 5 E.P.D. 8017, at 6745-46 (M.D.N.C. 1972); United States v.
Central Motor Lines, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 532, 562 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
78. E.g., Bowe v. Colgate, Palmolive Co., 489 F.2d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 1973). But see
Barth v. Bayou Candy Co., 379 F. Supp. 1201, 1202 (E.D. La. 1974).
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Since only a relatively small percentage of employers automati-
cally consider all eligible employees in filling a vacancy,7" in most
instances bidding is called for as an indication of employee interest
either before or after the vacancy occurs. Remedial decrees provid-
ing for contemporaneous rather than prospective bidding have re-
sulted in far greater transfers by members of the affected class.' "
Other decrees have stated that the practice of letting a job for bids
first in the department in which the vacancy occurs, then more
broadly only if it remains unfilled, perpetuates past discrimination
and thus violates Title VII.8
The part of the typical remedial order that addresses bidding
between the minority or female transferee and those resident to the
department has the potential for upsetting legitimate expectations
and increasing inter-group polarity. Although departmental senior-
ity is the coinage in which bids for promotion normally are made,8"
when a transferee belonging to the affected class is among the con-
tenders, seniority for all bidders will be computed on the basis of
plant rather than departmental seniority." Thus, the potential ex-
ists for white employees, who during their employment have
switched departments, so that their total plant seniority exceeds
their available departmental seniority, to snatch promotions from
the hands of other white employees with greater departmental sen-
iority by prompting a junior, black transferee to enter the competi-
tion. Once the black transferee's bid is received, the basis for calcu-
lation is changed, and the employee with the most plant seniority
gets the promotion.
As troublesome as this phenomenon is, the safeguarding of tra-
ditional expectations by intra-group primaries and inter-group run-
offs appears in only one reported case.84 On the other hand, the
79. See PROMOTMN AND TRANSFER, supra note 16, at 15-16.
80. Interview with Robert Moore, Deputy Chief, Employment Section of the Justice
Department's Civil Rights Division, BNA Daily Labor Report, May 29, 1974, at C-4. Trans-
fers by members of the affected class have been sharply restricted, however, when the decree
ordered that bids, multiple if desired, were to be filed with defendant employer within a time
certain, and subsequent declension of an offered transfer by a member of the affected class
worked a waiver of his other bids on file. Id. at C-3 & C-4.
81. E.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 224 (5th Cir. 1974);
Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870, 878-79 (6th Cir. 1973); Irvin v. Mohawk
Rubber Co., 308 F. Supp. 152, 157 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
82. See, e.g., United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 359 (8th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. 446 F.2d 652, 655 (2d Cir. 1971); In re Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 2 CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE 5128, at 3253 (1973).
83. See, e.g., United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 375 (8th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 666 (2d Cir. 1971); In re Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 2 CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE 5128, at 3253 (1973).
84. Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 6 E.P.D. 8912, at 5869-70 (S.D. Ala. 1973).
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Steelworkers Union was sufficiently alert to the possibility of this
subterfuge to insist that all competitions under the steel industry
decree85 be settled on the basis of plant seniority, thus obviating the
possibility of switching the rules of the game.
When the bidding starts, the calculation of an employee's ante-
cedent seniority is of signal importance. Some district courts have
mistakenly assumed that once female or minority hirees cease being
relegated to a less desirable department, the accrual of antecedent
seniority, like the prospect of membership in the class, ceases."8
Their logic is that once barriers to the newly hired employees' as-
signment to the more desirable departments are removed, those who
do not transfer into these departments-even at forfeiture of senior-
ity or rate of pay-must attribute subsequent injury to their own
dalliance. Such reasoning has not survived appeal. 8 As an appellate
court recently pointed out, it is the duty of the district court to
dissolve the barrier to transfers completely, not merely to reduce the
penalty.8 Additionally, save for one aberrational appellate excep-
tion,8' the antecedent seniority is available in toto, not fractionally.
Many of the seniority situations that have come before the
courts have involved not a transfer into a parallel progression line
running through the same department, as in Local 189, but transfers
between spatially remote departments that utilized different skills.
In cases like these, courts have allowed a probationary period, re-
flecting the employer's legitimate interests in safe and efficient op-
eration, to be imposed upon transferees with lengthy service but
little related experience." During this probationary period antece-
dent seniority cannot be used to bid on higher positions in the new
department." Antecedent seniority, however, may be used under
court decrees to resist layoff even during these probationary peri-
ods. 2 This availability of antecedent seniority is a partial response
85. Steel Industry Consent Decree in United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc.,
Civil No. 74-P-339 (N.D. Ala., Apr. 15, 1974), 8 BNA 1974 LAB. REL. REP., F.E.P. MANUAL §
431 at 125, 133.
86. See, e.g. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 5 F.E.P. Cas. 421, 424, 430 (N.D. Ga.
1972), rev'd, 495 F.2d 398 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3515 (U.S. Mar. 24, 1975).
87. E.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398, 416 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 43
U.S.L.W. 3515 (U.S. Mar. 24, 1975.
88. Id. at 416.
89. United States v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 464 F.2d 301, 311 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1107, 1116 (1973).
90. Newman v. Avco Corp., 8 F.E.P. Cas. 714, 717 (M.D. Tenn. 1974); United States
v. H.K. Porter Co., 7 F.E.P. Cas. 1021, 1023 (N.D. Ala. 1974); United States v. Florida E.
Coast Ry., 7 F.E.P. Cas. 540, 557 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
91. United States v. H.K. Porter Co., 7 F.E.P. Cas. 1021, 1024 (N.D. Ala. 1974); United
States v. United States Steel Corp., 371 F. Supp. 1045, 1056 n.25 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
92. E.g., Bragg v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 355 F. Supp. 345 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
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to genuine apprehensions about the greater vulnerability of tenure
that restrain many longer-term employees from transferring. Earlier
decrees often proved ineffectual by failing to allay apprehension
caused by two other possibilities: the inability to pass the proba-
tionary test, and the desire to return to the more familiar ways of
the former department. Assurance of retreat rights in these situa-
tions makes the option of transfer appear less treacherous. The more
thorough decrees are now providing for these two latter contingen-
cies.93
The disincentive of a cut in pay upon transfer has been ob-
viated by the use of "red circling," a wage rate retention device long
familiar in labor arbitration.94 This device continues the transferee's
wage rate from his prior department until he attains a higher rate
in the department into which he transferred. If, however, the jobs
in the departments from which women or minorities have heretofore
been excluded are not vertically linked, then advanced positions
admit of lateral entry, in which case wage-rate retention may not
be necessary."
A recurrent problem in the drafting of transfer decrees involves
the number of times a previously excluded employee is entitled to
transfer into another department with antecedent seniority. Al-
though the steel industry consent decree allows two exercises of this
transfer,97 decisions since Local 189 range from only a single good
93. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 8 LAB. REL. REp. 431:125, 135
(N.D. Ala. 1974) (consent decree); United States v. H.K. Porter Co., 7 F.E.P. Cas. 1021, 1023
(N.D. Ala. 1974); EEOC v. Frito-Lay, Inc., Civil No. 18281 (N.D. Ga., entered Apr. 15, 1974).
94. See Big Jack Mfg. Co., 27 Lab. Arb. 858 (1957); Dayton Steel Foundry Co., 29 Lab.
Arb. 260 (1957); Erie Forge & Steel Corp., 22 Lab. Aib. 551 (1954).
95. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 248 n.99 (5th Cir. 1974); see
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 661 (2d Cir. 1971).
Occasionally one encounters a transferee who subsequently fails to show the desire or
ability to advance to that remunerative a rate in his new department. In the more tightly
drafted decrees employer's counsel imposes safeguards against the remedy's becoming an
open ended benefaction. Cf. the following provisions from Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.,
321 F. Supp. 1241, 1243 (E.D. La. 1971).
Such Red Circle Rate shall continue until such employee:
(a) Progresses to a permanent job in the new line with a RJR [regular job rate]
higher than his Red Circle Rate, or
(b) Refuses promotion, temporary or permanent, to a higher job, or
(c) Is disqualified for promotion, temporary or permanent, to a higher job into
which he would otherwise move, or
(d) Chooses a branch of the progression line which will not lead to a job with a
RJR higher than his Red Circle Rate ....
96. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 248 n.100 (5th Cir. 1974);
Long v. Georgia Kraft Co., 450 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. H.K. Porter Co., 7
F.E.P. Cas. 1021, 1024 (N.D. Ala. 1974).
97. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 8 LAB. REL. REP. 431:125, 137
(N.D. Ala. 1974).
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faith opportunity18 to multiple tries at a single successful exercise.9
If, after the allowed number of transfers, prospects appear brighter
in yet another department, the employee who no longer suffers from
discriminatory placement incurs upon further transfer whatever dis-
incentives the collective bargaining agreement provides.' 0
In those instances when the courts have found that segregated
assignment or recall rosters were maintained by employers, they
have ordered them merged.' This must be done by dovetailing,
that is, by redrawing the rosters, without segregation, on the basis
of seniority. Endtailing or topping and bottoming of rosters have
been held unsatisfactory to meet the merger requirement.0 2
Although there is a tradition in labor relations of deferring to
private ordering of competing demands,0 3 discriminatory seniority
systems have not been saved by virtue of being embodied in a collec-
tive bargaining agreement.0 4 In addition, many of the boundaries
traditionally hallowed by organized labor have fallen before court
decrees that have allowed victims of discrimination to transfer
across collective bargaining units,0 5 crafts,' union locals,0 7 and
even internationals. 08
In decreeing that members of the affected class must be allowed
to transfer, the courts have attacked three distinct practices ostensi-
bly designed to foster efficiency or enhance morale through the
wider sharing of promotional opportunities. First, the courts' ap-
98. E.g., United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 456 F.2d 112, 119 (5th Cir. 1972).
99. E.g., United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 7 F.E.P. Cas. 540, 557 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
100. See, e.g., United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 375 (8th Cir. 1973).
101. Rock v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 473 F.2d 1344, 1349-50 (4th Cir. 1973); Guthrie v.
Colonial Bakery Co., 6 F.E.P. Cas. 662, 666 (N.D. Ga. 1973); cf. EEOC Decision No. 71-1938,
CCH 1973 EEOC Decisions 6273 (Apr. 29, 1971).
102. E.g., Rock v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 473 F.2d 1344, 1348-49 (4th Cir. 1973). The
requirement is that the rosters be combined in order of descending seniority and that the
black roster not simply be stapled to the end of the white roster.
103. Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564 (1960).
104. Vogler v. McCarty, Inc., 451 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Jackson-
ville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972); Local 53,
Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
105. Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 444 F.2d 687, 691 (5th Cir. 1971); Jones v. Lee Way
Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 249 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Central Motor Lines,
Inc., 338 F. Supp. 532, 558 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
106. United States v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 471 F.2d 582, 588-89 (4th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 939 (1973); United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 458
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972); United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 7
F.E.P. Cas. 540, 557 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
107. E.g., Carey v. Greyhound Bus Co., Inc., 500 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1974).
108. Id.
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proach under Title VII to the requirement of residency within a
position for further promotion has markedly changed in recent
years. A typical district court remedy from 1972 provided that "no
member of the class involved herein to which the remedy applies
shall be subjected to any unduly burdensome residency requirement
in a new department prior to moving up through the various lines
of job progression which was not previously required of similarly
situated employees, white or black, as a condition to the exercise of
this remedial seniority in any new department."10 9 More recently the
courts' concern has been directed not toward guarding against the
increase of invidious residency requirements, but toward recogniz-
ing that residency requirements can perpetuate past discrimination
by imposing a greater delay upon the progress of the affected class
than can be justifiedoby demands of business necessity. ' 0
Secondly, judicial suspicion has focused on the limitation of
bids on file in the plant's personnel office."' What formerly may
have been considered an unobjectionable cost/benefit balancing
when only white males had bids on file recently has been held to
violate Title VII if unsupported by business necessity" 2-a less cost-
sensitive standard'13 than the former balancing. This system oper-
ated as a restriction on the possible promotion of members of the
affected class.
Thirdly, a limitation on the number of promotions an employee
could enjoy during the life of the collective bargaining agreement
was overturned by a federal district court as a barrier to the catch-
up efforts of the affected class that was unsupported by business
necessity.'
109. Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 349 F. Supp. 3, 17 (S.D. Tex. 1972),
modified, 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974).
110. Afro American Patrolmen's League v. Duck, 503 F.2d 294 (6th Cir. 1974); Pettway
v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 238 n.66 (5th Cir. 1974); Harper v. Kloster,
486 F.2d 1134, 1137 (4th Cir. 1973); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 1341 (2d Cir. 1973); Russell v. American Tobacco Co., 374 F. Supp.
286 (M.D.N.C. 1973); EEOC Decision No. 70-522, Feb. 19, 1970, CCH EEOC Decision 6139
(1973).
111. Newman v. Avco Corp., 8 F.E.P. Cas. 714, 716 (M.D. Tenn. 1974).
112. Id. (semble).
113. United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 366 (8th Cir. 1973); Robinson v.
Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 799 n.8 (4th Cir. 1971); Diaz v. Pan Am World Airways, Inc.,
442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971). Although the cost of compliance has clearly been rejected
as a defense in the foregoing cases, the dimensions of a backpay remedy for uncritical reliance
on the "last hired/first fired" principle in imposing layoffs may now be so sizeable as to give
courts pause in the future application of this rule. Ford Motor Company, for example, has
temporarily laid off 55% of its hourly paid work force. N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1975, at 1, col. 7.
114. United States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 532, 558 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
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III. RECENTLY EMERGENT PROBLEMS TESTING THE DOCTRINES OF
United States v. Local 189
As mentioned earlier, the appellate decision in Local 189 is now
controverted in six of its doctrines.
First, the Local 189 court held that the perpetuation of past
discrimination through the application of facially neutral principles
is an evil that departmental seniority systems possibly may impose
on minorities but that plant-wide systems do not impose. The ques-
tion now being raised is whether the appellate court, speaking in a
time of economic expansion-when the transfer but not the layoff
problem would have surfaced-spoke exhaustively or merely illus-
tratively of the perpetuation of past discrimination. Differences con-
cerning that premise are at the crux of the dispute over whether a
plant-wide layoff can violate Title VII and will be treated more fully
later in this article.
A second Local 189 doctrine, that relief should be determined
by a "but for" test and granted only to those identifiably wronged,
has faded perceptibly in subsequent court decisions. The longevity
bonus point cases'15 illustrate this trend. In the Mobile, Baltimore,
Cleveland, and Toledo police departments, longevity in grade
earned extra points toward promotion. Recently hired black officers
challenged the practice as perpetuating past discrimination because
white officers averaged more points than black officers. None of the
courts thought it necessary to find that any of the black officers
ought to have been hired earlier than he was. Rather, the courts
proceeded from the belated entry of blacks into the department and
faulted the longevity bonus point system as an impediment to oth-
ers of that race.
The third Local 189 doctrine, that relief does not countenance
the displacement of incumbents, but operates instead in terms of
future vacancies, has encountered low visibility modification and
high visibility challenge. The low visibility modification has come
in cases in which rights of recall were denied, increasing the number
of slots considered vacant.' In one case the preemptive recall rights
of furloughed workers laid off for more than sixty days were pruned
by judicial fiat.17 The high visibility challenge came in two cases,
115. Shield Club v. City of Cleveland, 370 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Afro Ameri-
can Patrolmen's League v. Duck, 366 F. Supp. 1095 (N.D. Ohio 1973), modified, 503 F.2d
294 (6th Cir. 1974); Harper v. Mayor & City Council, 359 F. Supp. 1187 (D. Md.), aff'd sub
nom., Harper v. Kloster, 486 F. 2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973); Allen v. City of Mobile, 331 F. Supp.
1134 (S.D. Ala. 1971), afl'd, 466 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973).
116. United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 7 F.E.P. Cas. 540, 544 (M.D. Fla. 1974);
United States v. United States Steel Corp., 371 F. Supp. 1045, 1056-57 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
117. United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry. Co., 7 F.E.P. Cas. 540 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
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Guthrie v. Colonial Bakery"' and Patterson v. American Tobacco
Co. 119
In Guthrie the restriction of female bakery workers to a cake
department meant that when the department was subsequently
closed, the female employees were laid off, while more junior, male
employees remained at work in the bread department. The court
ordered that women with greater seniority be offered the positions
held by the junior men. Since the deprivation in Guthrie was drasti-
cally more severe than that in Local 189, the court actions do not
really seem irreconcilable, despite Guthrie's displacement of incum-
bents.
In Patterson, a Virginia tobacco facility that discriminated
against blacks and females was required, with limited exceptions,
to put every non-supervisory job up for bids on the basis of seniority
and willingness to learn the job. Displaced incumbents bumped to
lower job classifications were to have their wages red-circled so that
they would suffer no loss in salary. This order has been criticized
because it seems akin to the ouster of whites to make room for
blacks that the floor leaders of Title VII specifically disavowed in
Senate debate.1 20 Moreover, the rejoinder that the whites ousted
from more desirable nonsupervisory positions were not discharged
is supported only by a one-dimensional view of what a worker de-
rives from his job; although the wages remained, the displaced
worker was deprived of the significant psychological benefits de-
rived from his status and craft. The significance of that dimension
cannot be disregarded lightly.121
The subsidy paid the "bumped-but-retained" workers cannot
be considered a remedy for past discrimination that they might
have suffered. It should be viewed as one of the rare equitable
awards under Title VII other than backpay rather than an award of
punitive damages, for which Title VII has been construed not to
provide. 12 Beyond the narrow statutory question, there remains in
the minds of many a further question about the propriety of increas-
ing a company's on-going costs in a highly competitive industry.
The laissez-faire thrust of the fourth doctrine of the Local 189
118. 6 F.E.P. Cas. 662 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
119. 8 F.E.P. Cas. 778 (E.D. Va. 1974).
120. See note 59, supra.
121. G. FRIEDMANN, THE ANATOMY OF WORK 122-28 (1961). See generally F. HERzBE G,
B. MAUSNER & B. BLOCK, THE MOTIVATION TO WORK (2d ed. 1959); A. LEVENSTEIN, WHY PEOPLE
WORK (1962).
122. Loo v. Gerarge, 374 F. Supp. 1338 (D. Hawaii 1974); Howard v. Lockheed-Georgia
Co., 372 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 368 F. Supp. 829 (N.D.
Cal. 1973).
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decision, that an acceptable promotion of personnel can be had with
a minimum of adjustment to the existing promotional mechanism,
by folding in the affected class on the basis of their plant seniority,
is encountering doubters. In nine recent district court actions pro-
motion figures have been fixed, by consent of decree in four cases, 123
and by rendition of judgment in the other five.' The courts of
appeal are divided over the propriety of promotion quotas. In the
Second Circuit it is an abuse of discretion, but not so in the Sixth
Circuit. 125
The fifth Local 189 doctrine, that the conferral of "fictional
seniority" is inconsistent with Title VII, subsumes two and possibly
three distinct reservations. The disapproval reflects an apprehen-
sion that those hired may not be those earlier discriminated against,
a lack of guidance on how much remedial seniority to confer, and
perhaps an unarticulated, ex post facto reservation. It has been
pointed out that a black discriminated against in connection with
hiring after Title VII became effective could enjoy, consistent with
Local 189, fictional seniority. 1 6 Indeed, at least five courts have
awarded seniority that was fictional in that it did not reflect hours
worked. 2 17 This "date of application" seniority was given to plain-
tiffs who had suffered dateable, and in most cases, explicitly post-
Act discrimination. These five cases were characterized by identifia-
ble parties, precisely calculable injuries, and no compelling ex post
facto anxieties.
123. Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, Civil No. 73-2604 (E.D. Pa., June 24, 1974);
Corley v. Jackson (Miss.) Police Dep't, Civil No. 73 J-4(C) (S.D. Miss., entered March 25,
1974); United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 8 LAB. REL. Rm., 431:125, 137 (N.D.
Ala. 1974); EEOC v. Frito-Lay, Inc., Civil No. 18281 (N.D. Ga., entered Apr. 15, 1974).
124. Kirkland v. Nbw York State Dep't of Corrections, 8 E.P.D. 9675 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
Pennsylvania v. Rizzo, 8 E.P.D. 9681 (1974) (preliminary injunction), 9 E.P.D. 9891 (E.D.
Pa. 1975) (final judgment); Schaefer v. Tannian, 8 E.P.D. 9605 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Bridge-
port Guardians, Inc., v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 354 F. Supp. 778 (D. Conn.), rev'd,
482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973); Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich.
1973).
125. Compare Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d
1333, 1341 (2d Cir. 1973) with E.E.O.C. v. Detroit Edison Co., 10 F.E.P. Cas. 239 (6th Cir.
1975).
126. Gould, Black Workers Inside the House of Labor, 407 ANNs 78, 84-85 (1973).
127. Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Corp., 489 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1973); Jurinko v. Wiegand
Co., 477 F.2d 1038 (3d Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 970 (1973);
United States v. Georgia Power Co., 7 E.P.D. 9167 (N.D. Ga. 1974); United States v. Lee
Way Motor Freight, Inc., 7 E.P.D. 9066 (W.D. Okla. 1973); Hester v. Southern Ry., 349 F.
Supp. 821 (N.D. Ga. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 497 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir.
1974). In United States v. United States Steel Corp., the court states by way of dictum: "Use
of plant age or even company age would not necessarily be an appropriate remedy if the
company had been guilty in the past of racial discrimination in hiring." 371 F. Supp. 1045,
1056 n.26 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
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The Fifth Circuit has taken the position that Title VII does not
permit the award of retroactive seniority to those discriminatorily
denied employment under the Act, indicating that this conclusion
is compelled by their earlier decision in Local 189.128 This is clearly
a nonsequitur.'29 Although the Act may be only prospective'3 0 and
pre-Act seniority rights thereby unaffected, 3' not a word of the 1964
legislative history precludes the fashioning of relief for an injury
that was inflicted after the effective date of the Act. The legislative
history of the 1972 amendments is evidently hospitable to date-of-
application seniority. 3 2
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit has concluded that the award of
date-of-application seniority, although problematic, is not prohib-
ited, as the Fifth Circuit assumes. 33 The Sixth Circuit has recog-
nized that although the burden of retroactive pay falls upon the
party that violated the law, the burden of retroactive seniority for
determination of layoff would fall directly upon workers who have
had no hand in the wrong-doing. Nevertheless, appropriate occa-
sions for the award of retroactive seniority can be found.' 34 When
appropriate relief is governed by fringe-benefit seniority rather than
competitive-status seniority, i.e. vacation or pension rights, the
Sixth Circuit flatly holds that the date of application should apply.
128. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398, 417-18 (5th Cir. 1974). Although the
company's petition for certiorari has been denied, 95 S. Ct. 625, the Supreme Court has
granted certiorari on the cross-application by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund on behalf of
plaintiffs' denied date-of-application seniority claim. 43 U.S.L.W. 3515 (U.S. Mar. 24, 1975).
129. Judge Wisdom's dicta were addressed to the propriety of giving a remedy to per-
sons whose rejection before enactment of Title VII was not then unlawful. He also questioned
whether remedies should be granted to new employees who were not themselves the victims
of past discrimination. He did not address the status of those discriminated against under
the Act.
130. See text accompanying note 59, supra.
131. Id.
132. "In dealing with the present § 706(g) the courts have stressed that the scope of
relief under that section of the Act is intended to make the victims of unlawful discrimination
whole, and that the attainment of this objective rests not only upon the elimination of the
particular unlawful employment practice complained of, but also requires that persons ag-
grieved by the consequences and effects of the unlawful employment practice be, so far as
possible, restored to a position where they would have been were it not for the unlawful
discrimination." 118 Cong. Rec. 7168 (1972) (Conference Report) (emphasis added).
133. Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 9 E.P.D. 9907 (6th Cir. 1975).
134. A long-standing and clearly analogous measure in our national labor policy is the
reinstatement with retroactive seniority of employees or applicants for employment who have
been discriminated against because of union membership. See, e.g., NLRB v. Cone Bros.
Contracting Co., 317 F.2d 3, 7 (5th Cir. 1963); Atlantic Maintenance Co. v. NLRB, 305 F.2d
604 (3d Cir. 1962), enforcing 134 N.L.R.B. 1328 (1961) (requiring reinstatement of rejected
applicant with full seniority status); NLRB v. Lamar Creamery Co., 246 F.2d 3, 10 (5th Cir.
1957), enforcing 115 N.L.R.B. 1113 (1956) (rejected applicant ordered reinstated "without
prejudice to seniority").
TITLE VII SENIORITY REMEDIES
The sixth Local 189 doctrine now controverted is the condem-
nation of segregated seniority rosters. Recently, segregated seniority
rosters have appeared in both consent decrees and court decisions.135
Although race or sex is proscribed as a basis upon which an employ-"
ment benefit may be denied, recognition of race or sex has been
required by the courts when necessary to undo the effects of past
discrimination. 3 ' The decrees in the steel industry litigation3 ' pro-
vide for separate seniority rosters in the less-skilled production and
maintenance units for white males, black males, women, and, where
appropriate, Spanish-surnamed Americans. Promotions to the more
remunerative trade and craft openings are to be filled from the
separately maintained rosters with fifty percent of the openings
earmarked for women and minorities, almost certainly according a
fictional seniority to members of these groups.
Thus, amid signs of evident economic advance for minorities,
the court in Local 189, envisioned a complete solution for employ-
ment inequities if, in the long run, the minority groups formerly
excluded could only be folded in to the seniority system. The heady
progress seen in 1969, however, has been stalled. The median in-
come of black families in constant dollars grew by thirty-two per-
cent from the effective date of Title VII in 1965 to the decision in
Local 189 in 1969,131 but it showed no further growth from 1969 to
1973.111 In fact, the overall income differential between black and
white families has widened since 1969.140 The unemployment rate for
"Negro and other races," which had dropped from 8.1 percent in
1965 to 6.4 percent in 1969, had risen to 8.9 percent by 1973.141 By
February 1975, that figure soared to 13.4 percent. 42 The clamorous
demands under Title VII presently being brought, therefore, reflect
not only the rising expectations born of realized improvement but
135. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 8 LAB. REL. REP. 431:125, 139
(N.D. Ala. 1974); Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Local 327, Electrical Workers, 8 F.E.P.
Cas. 959, 960 (D.N.J. 1974); Watkins v. Local 2369, Steelworkers, 8 F.E.P. Cas. 729, 731 (E.D.
La. 1974); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 8 F.E.P. Cas. 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
136. NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053
(5th Cir. 1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 173 (1974); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d
315 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
137. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 8 LAB. REL. REP. 431:125, 138
(N.D. Ala. 1974).
138. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS




141. Id. at 45, table 28.
142. Wall Street J., Feb. 10, 1975, at 3, col. 2.
1975]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
also the knowledge that past gains are being lost. Reflecting on the
disproportionate job loss that economic downturn holds for minori-
ties, a principal speaker at the 1974 annual convention of the Na-
tional Business League, the minority counterpart of the National
Chamber of Commerce, called for a governmentally established
quota system that would allow only a certain percentage of minority
employees to be laid off as a sagging economy forces businesses to
resort to increased cutbacks in their work forces.
1 3
Should certain portions of the workforce, identified by sex,
race, or national origin be specially protected absent a finding of
prior discrimination by the employer?' What are the legal limits
for remedying sex or race discrimination in the imposition of lay-
offs? The following section addresses these questions.
IV. THE PECULIAR PROBLEMS INCIDENT TO LAYOFFS
When layoffs become unavoidable, as in response to economic
downturn, employers generally prefer to dispense with those workers
least qualified to perform the remaining work and to minimize re-
training, transfers, and bumping of junior employees.' 4' This is a
prerogative a private employer may exercise freely unless it has been
qualified or limited by a collective bargaining agreement. The
E.E.O.C., for example, has found no cause to give credence to alle-
gations of racial discrimination when the employer's records showed
that the more senior employees laid off had experienced problems
directly affecting their performance.' There is kindred judicial au-
thority holding the layoff of females with greater seniority than
retained males not illegal when those retained could perform a wider
variety of tasks than those laid off.' 4
Most of the earlier cases decided under Title VII involving lay-
off concerned workers on seniority rosters segregated by sex' or
143. Atlanta Constitution, Oct. 25, 1974, at 16-D, cols. 7 & 8. Compare the 3 decrees
discussed in the text accompanying notes 183-88, infra.
144. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 320 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
145. LAYoFF, RECALL, supra note 17, at 1.
146. EEOC Decision No. 75-037, 2 CCH EL. PRAC. GumE 6437 (Oct. 2, 1974).
147. Trivett v. Tri-State Container Corp., 368 F. Supp. 131 (E.D. Tenn. 1973). A deci-
sion to let older workers go, however, even a cleverly benign decision as was proposed for some
860 of New York City's municipal workers, may run afoul of the federal Act Against Age
Discrimination in Employment, which protects workers over 40 and under 65. 29 U.S.C. §§
621 et seq.; N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1974, at 1, col. 5. Under the New York arrangement, worked
out with the City's Municipal Employees Union, 860 workers over 63 would have been
prompted to retire immediately rather than at 65. Their pensions, Social Security benefits
and free health insurance were calculated to keep them at roughly the same income level as
they then enjoyed. N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1974, at 1, col. 3.
148. Guthrie v. Colonial Bakery Co., 6 F.E.P. Cas. 662 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Ostapowicz v.
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race' who had suffered a disproportionate share of unemployment.
More recently, however, a group of cases has arisen in which layoff
was determined on the basis of a single roster reflecting departmen-
tal or other less than plant-wide seniority.'50 In these cases the em-
ployee's initial assignment had been limited, if not fixed, by the
worker's race or sex. Almost without exception, transfers resulted in
a forfeiture of competitive-status seniority. Employees thus
"locked-in" were subject to layoff while a white male with less em-
ployment seniority was retained. Thus, these cases151 involved a
recessionary analogue to the perpetuation of past discrimination
condemned in Local 189.
In 1974 a more difficult group of cases caused a division be-
tween the courts and the enforcement agencies. The question was
whether the belated opening of jobs in a plant to women and minori-
ties forbids reliance on plant-wide seniority in determining layoffs.
Does the routine firing of the last-hired perpetuate yesteryear's ex-
clusion of female and minority workers?
The question was first faced in Watkins v. Local 2639, United
Steelworkers of America,52 when the court confronted the aftermath
of a major cutback in the operations of a southern Louisiana can
factory. The plant had hired two blacks during World War II but
hired no others until 1965. Significant minority hiring in 1969, 1970
and 1971 resulted in a peak of more than fifty black employees in
1971. Subsequent economic downturn, however, caused the layoff of
plaintiff and other employees hired as far back as 1951. When the
case got to court, the company had an all-white work force except
for the two blacks hired during World War II. Awarding summary
judgment, the court rejected the reliance on seniority, even though
it was plant-wide.' The court bottomed its decision on the princi-
ple that "employment preference cannot be allocated on the basis
of length of service or seniority, where blacks were, by virtue of prior
discrimination, prevented from accumulating relevant seniority."' 54
The district judge explicitly addressed the previously quoted
Johnson Bronze Co., 369 F. Supp. 522 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 329 F.
Supp. 563 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
149. E.g., Buckner v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 339 F. Supp. 1108 (N.D. Ala. 1972),
afl'd, 476 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir. 1973).
150. Bowe v. Colgate, Palmolive Co., 489 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1973); Cox v. Allied Chem.
Corp., 382 F. Supp. 309 (M.D. La. 1974); Wells v. Frontier Airlines, 381 F. Supp. 818 (N.D.
Tex. 1974).
151. See, e.g., Cox v. Allied Chem. Corp., 382 F. Supp. 309 (M.D. La. 1974).
152. [merits] 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La. 1974), [remedial order] 8 F.E.P. Cas. 729.




comments of Senator Clark,15 but denied their dispositive authority
by noting that the Senator's comments were addressed to the
House-passed version, which the Senate did not adopt and ante-
dated by fifty days the introduction of the subsequently-enacted,
revised substitute bill that first contained section 703(h), 56 the ex-
emption for the bona fide seniority system. The district judge con-
sidered the court in Local 189 to have been preoccupied by the
problems of the internally segregated plant and thus undelibera-
tively to have shunted aside the question of the all-white plant.
Viewing Local 189 as not having dealt with the question before him,
the district judge opted to follow the Equal Employment Opportun-
ity Commission decision discussed earlier17 in which the Commis-
sion respectfully disagreed with the holding in Local 189.
Recently, the reasoning of Watkins was reiterated by another
trial court in the Fifth Circuit. In Delay v. Carling Brewing Co.,,58
defendant's belated (1963) hiring of blacks occasioned a dispropor-
tionately large percentage of minority-employee layoffs when plant-
wide seniority was relied upon. The court denied defendant's motion
for summary judgment, holding that affirmative action is required
to eliminate such vestiges of pre-Act discrimination even when per-
petuated by a system of plant-wide seniority.
Support for the view set forth in the Watkins and Delay deci-
sions is to be found in the temporary restraining order entered in
Loy v. City of Cleveland.'59 There, recently-appointed female police
officers sought to enjoin an announced layoff of the eighty-nine most
junior officers. The reduction was based on seniority and would have
meant a layoff of eighty-seven percent of the females appointed in
1973, but only 42.5 percent of the males appointed in that year. The
court noted:
In this case, the stipulated facts indicate a strong likelihood that plaintiffs
will be able to show a history of discrimination against women applicants. The
facts also indicate a strong likelihood that the plaintiffs will be able to show
that the seniority system is based on past discriminatory hiring and further to
show that the Court's duty to affirmatively correct past discrimination would
warrant the preclusion of the use of seniority.6 0
A view wholly contrary to Watkins and Loy was taken by the
Seventh Circuit in its recent decision in Waters v. Wisconsin Steel
155. Id. at 1227-28.
156. Id. at 1228.
157. See note 70 supra and accompanying text.
158. 9 E.P.D. 9877 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
159. 8 F.E.P. Cas. 614, dismissed as moot, 8 F.E.P. Cas. 617 (N.D. Ohio 1974). But cf.
Bales v. General Motors Corp., 9 F.E.P. Cas. 234 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
160. Id. at 616.
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Works"' (hereinafter referred to as Waters II). The appellate court
reversed a district court decision 2 that defendant's pre-1964 refusal
to hire blacks was perpetuated by the imposition of layoffs based on
actual-employment seniority. The appeals court found the plant-
wide seniority system to be free of the infirmities that could infest
a system of departmental seniority, saying that under the latter
19 * 'continuing restrictions on transfer and promotion create
unearned or artificial expectations of preference in favor of white
workers when compared with black incumbents having an equal or
greater length of service."'6 3 The court felt, on the other hand, that
a plant-wide seniority system preserved "only the earned expecta-
tions of long-service employees."' 64 The comments of Senator
Clark" 5 were relied on by the appeals court, as were excerpts from
Local 189 requiring "that time actually worked in Negro jobs be
given equal status with time worked in white jobs."' 6 The court
concluded that "creating fictional employment time for newly-hired
Negroes would comprise preferential rather than remedial treat-
ment."'67
The court considered defendant's plant-wide seniority system
wholly worthy of the "bona fide" characterization, thus bringing it
within the exemption of section 703(h).111 The court then announced
in a footnote that since it passed scrutiny under Title VII, the sen-
iority system did not violate 42 U.S.C. § 1981,169 on which plaintiffs
had relied in the alternative.'
Emphatic support for the Waters II view was registered in the
Third Circuit's split decision in Jersey Central Power & Light Co.
161. 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974). The Roman numeral is affixed to distinguish this
decision from the previous Court of Appeals ruling in this same litigation on whether a cause
of action was made out under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970).
162. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 8 F.E.P. Cas. 234 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
163. 502 F.2d at 1320.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1318-19 (quoted in note 61 supra).
166. Id. at 1319 (quoting from 416 F.2d 980, 995 (5th Cir. 1969)).
167. Id.
168. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h). See text accompanying note 60 supra.
169. 502 F.2d at 1320 n.4. "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every state and territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is
enjoyed by white citizens. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) (derived from the Civil Rights Acts
of 1866 and 1870). A ruling that seniority systems perpetuate past discrimination in violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, but not of Title VII, would be vexing to female workers because § 1981
is construed as not reaching situations of sex discrimination. See Braden v. University of
Pittsburgh, 343 F. Supp. 836 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Williams v. San Francisco Unified School
Dist., 340 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Fitzgerald v. United Methodist Community Center,
335 F. Supp. 965 (D. Neb. 1972).
170. The absence of any analogous exemption for "bona fide" seniority systems under
§ 1981 leaves this portion of the court's opinion unsatisfyingly elliptical.
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v. Local 327, Electrical Workers.17 1 That court found a facially neu-
tral, plant-wide seniority system to be bona fide, notwithstanding
evidence that it perpetuated the effects of past employment dis-
crimination. The court reasoned:
Congress, while recognizing that a bona fide seniority system might well
perpetuate past discriminatory practices, nevertheless chose between upset-
ting all collective bargaining agreements with such provisions and permitting
them despite the perpetuating effect they might have. We believe that Con-
gress intended a plant-wide seniority system, facially neutral but having a
disproportionate impact on female and minority group workers, to be a bona
fide system within the meaning of § 703(h) of the Act."'
The federal government's administrative enforcers, O.F.C.C.
and E.E.O.C., have publicly assumed divergent stances on the dif-
fering court decisions. Solicitor of Labor William Kilberg, who di-
rects the O.F.C.C.'s efforts at judicial enforcement, has stated: "A
man has certain property rights in his present job and, in order to
take this away from him, you should be able to say more than, 'The
company in years past discriminated against another worker and
therefore we are going to take your job away from you.""" Kilberg
accepts the Seventh Circuit decision in Waters II, explaining: "The
court is saying 'we recognize there may have been a wrong commit-
ted in layoffs, but the remedy creates another wrong.' Upsetting the
seniority system doesn't look like a viable legal remedy in view of
that ruling.' 1 74 Solicitor Kilberg feels that the Watkins decision, on
the other hand, should not be upheld because it gives blacks false
or fictional seniority. 175
The E.E.O.C., in contrast, has filed an amicus brief seeking to
uphold the Watkins decision now on appeal in the Fifth Circuit. In
the brief the E.E.O.C. argues that even a plant-wide seniority sys-
tem that carries forward the incidents of past discrimination is not
bona fide and thus is not within the exemption of section 703(h) .17
Alternatively, the Commission argues that even if that kind of sen-
iority system is exempted under Title VII, it must succumb under
42 U.S.C. § 1981, which lacks an analogous exemption. 77
The authors of the amicus brief take pains to stress the narrow-
ness of the rule for which they argue. It is applicable only when past
171. 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975).
172. Id. at 708.
173. B.N.A., Daily Labor Report, May 29, 1974, p. C-3.
174. Wall Street J., Nov. 5, 1974, at 27, col. 5.
175. N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1974, at 5, col. 3.
176. Brief for EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 11, Watkins v. Local 2369, Steelworkers, Civil
No. 74-2604 (5th Cir., 1974).
177. Id. at 15.
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discrimination is still reflected in the seniority system. Absent a
continued reflection of past discrimination, even a layoff falling
with particular severity on minorities would not be illegal.7 8 "For
example, if an employer demonstrated that for several years it has
attempted to recruit blacks to fill positions as aeronautical engi-
neers, but succeeded in hiring only four in 1971, an economic layoff
in 1974 which, on a seniority basis, would require the layoff of the
four blacks would not be unlawful even though it had a disparate
effect on blacks.' ' 79
An additional narrowness not urged by the brief-writers also
may find its way into the Court of Appeals decision. In two of that
court's recent opinions,' the retroactive reach of section 1981 in a
back-pay claim was limited to July 2, 1965, the effective date of
Title VII. The court in each case reasoned that section 1981 had
fallen into disuse and had left parties without any distinct notice of
potential liability for employment discrimination until Title VII
came into effect. The same reasoning might prompt a similar ruling
with regard to the reform of seniority systems. Furthermore, the
choice of July 2, 1965, would coincidently give effect to Senator
Clark's averment that seniority earned prior to the effective date of
Title VII would not be disturbed.'
On the more basic question, whether the Fifth Circuit will up-
hold Watkins' finding of a violation, it is interesting to note an aside
in one of that court's recent footnotes: "We have observed that past
discrimination may penalize black employees in a reduction-in-
force situation, and think that affirmative relief is necessary to rem-
edy such effects.' 8 2 Whether the Court of Appeals will uphold the
178. It might be instructive to look at the decision in Roman v. E.S.B., Inc., 368 F.
Supp. 47 (D.S.C. 1973), as an approximation of the principle here contended for. The court
in that case found there to be no history of overt discrimination in a plant built in 1965.
Consequently a layoff imposed on the basis of seniority did not violate Title VII even though
the impact fell with greater severity on the black component of the workforce than upon the
white. A similar approximation of this principle is found in a recent decision of the District
Court in Oregon. A preliminary injunction against a county that used a seniority roster to
lay off employees for budgetary reasons was denied even though the use of a seniority roster
would result in a harsher impact upon racial minorities. The court explained in an oral
opinion that the statistics presented to it failed to show past racial discrimination by the
county. United Community Action Comm. v. Gleason, No. 74-438 (D. Ore., entered June 24,
1974), reported in Rappoport, Laying Off Employees Pursuant to a Seniority System, BNA
SPECIAL REPORT (Feb. 21, 1975).
179. Brief for EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 14, Watkins v. Local 2369, Steelworkers, No.
74-2604 (5th Cir. 1974).
180. Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1379 (5th Cir. 1974);
Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 255-56 (5th Cir. 1974).
181. See text accompanying note 61 supra.
182. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 248 n.103 (5th Cir. 1974).
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lower court's two-part remedial order merits separate consideration.
Concerning layoffs, the subject of the first part of the remedial
order, the trial court decreed that "additional layoffs . . . shall be
allocated between white employees and black employees in accord-
ance with their respective percentage of the work force at the time
the layoffs are to be made. . . .Within each racial group, persons
shall be laid off in reverse order of their plant seniority." '83 In this
regard, however, it should be noted that whenever a seniority list
that does not embody perfect alternation is subdivided on the basis
of race or sex, fictional seniority arises. The employee finds himself
or herself nearer the top in the subdivided list than he or she would
have been if an undivided list had been used. Even though fictional
seniority for the newly hired was condemned by the Fifth Circuit in
196984 and again in 1974,185 in this case the distinction exists that
the fictional seniority goes first to old hands.
In structuring future layoffs to avoid diminishing the percen-
tage share of the workforce represented by minorities, the Watkins
order has been joined by at least two like orders. In the recently
reversed case of Jersey Central Power Co. v. Local 327, Electrical
Workers the district court ordered that three seniority lists be drawn
up, one for minority employees, one for female employees, and one
for "all other" employees. If a white male had the right under the
collective bargaining agreement to bump a less senior employee, he
nevertheless was barred from bumping a less senior female or minor-
ity employee if the percentage of women and minorities in the work
force was already fifteen percent below the goal of the affirmative
action program. The court's stated intention was to ensure that
when layoffs were completed minority employees and female em-
ployees would constitute essentially the same proportion of the total
work force that they did when the layoff process began."'8
On November 22, 1974, a currently unreported order was en-
tered by Federal District Judge Harold R. Tyler, Jr., as a sequel to
the litigation in Chance v. Board of Examiners.'87 The order pro-
vides that budgetarily induced layoffs in the New York City School
System must not reduce the existing percentage of positions enjoyed
by black or Puerto Rican supervisors. The ratio reflected in the
separate listing of black, Puerto Rican or other Latin American, and
183. 8 F.E.P. Cas. 729, 731 (E.D. La. 1974).
184. Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 995 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
185. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398, 417-18 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 43
U.S.L.W. 3515 (U.S. Mar. 24, 1975).
186. 8 F.E.P. Cas. 959, 960 (D.N.J. 1974).
187. 330 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), afi'd, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972).
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all other supervisors must be used to apportion future layoffs. 18
The second dimension of the remedial order in Watkins-that
relating to recall-is even more problematic.
1. The names on the existing recall list shall be divided into separate black
and white recall lists. Recalls then should be accomplished on a one-for-one
basis, using the separate lists, until all persons on the black list have been
recalled to work.
2. Subsequently, the Company shall fill existing vacancies from the white list
until either all the names on the list are recalled to work, or until remaining
persons on the list have lost recall rights under the collective bargaining agree-
ment. The Company shall then exclusively hire black persons, if available,
until the then current percentage of black employees in the work force is equal
to the percentage of black employees on active non-probationary status as of
the last date in 1971 on which a new employee was hired.
3. Thereafter, the Company may employ additional persons from any other
source, as necessary in a manner consistent with the requirements of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 as amended."'
The first paragraph embodies the same sort of fictional senior-
ity created by the first part of the remedial order, although again
veteran employees are benefited first. This paragraph effectively
supplants the collective bargaining agreement's provision providing
for recalls from layoff in a single sequence of plant seniority. Several
courts have imposed a reduction in recall rights in order to increase
the number of vacancies available for remedial action.' These deci-
sions can be justified by the argument that a laid off employee has
no vested right in a future vacancy. Therefore, the need to rehire on
the basis of seniority is less compelling than the requirement to lay
off on that basis.
The second paragraph is the most likely to draw criticism, espe-
cially for its second sentence, since the blacks hired are not likely
to be those who were rebuffed in years past. Another federal judge
has criticized the windfall under Watkins to "minority individuals
who have not themselves suffered the effects of discrimination, '" 1 91
echoing the dictum of Local 189.192 Nevertheless, no telling objection
can be made to the remedy of racially-exclusive hiring of qualified
applicants for a calculable period. This practice was approved under
the conceptual endorsement of "a temporary . . . freeze on white
hiring" in Morrow v. Crisler.193 Whatever preferential treatment sec-
tion 703(j) may forbid, it is now widely understood that "the present
188. Chance v. Board of Examiners, Civil No. 70-4141 (S.D.N.Y., entered Nov. 22,
1974).
189. 8 F.E.P. Cas. at 731.
190. See note 21 supra.
191. Cox v. Allied Chem. Corp., 382 F. Supp. 309, 319 (M.D. La. 1974).
192. 416 F.2d at 995.
193. 491 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 173 (1974).
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correction of past discrimination is not preferential treatment."'"4 If
the second paragraph's second sentence is to be faulted successfully,
the criticism most likely will be centered on its creation of construc-
tive seniority in newly hired blacks: if, in the midst of the racially-
exclusive hiring phase, a layoff is necessitated, newly-hired blacks
could be laid off only in alternation with previously recalled whites.
A fundamental cause of the division between the
Watkins/Delay/Loy line of cases and the Waters II/Jersey Central
line lies in disagreement over whether Senator Clark's remarks are
dispositive of the legislative history.'9 5 Inquiry into the more
plausible reading of the legislative history, which has produced a
wide array of judicial conclusions, may soon cease to be the relevant
inquiry. Three days after the Third Circuit's decision in Jersey
Central, it was reported that E.E.O.C. Chairman John H. Powell,
Jr., soon would seek the adoption by the Commission of guidelines
on layoff. '96
Once guidelines are adopted by an agency charged with the
administration of the statute, a judicial deference comes into play'97
and defense counsel must show not just that its reading is the more
plausible, but rather that the agency's reading clearly contravenes
the legislative history.'9 7.' Indeed, while the proposed guidelines
have not been set out as of this writing, it is not likely that they will
fall short of the Commission's amicus position in the appeal of
Watkins before the Fifth Circuit-that plant-wide seniority systems
violate Title VII if they perpetuate the consequences of past dis-
crimination and that in these situations the percentages that fe-
males and minorities constitute of an employer's workforce should
not be diminished by the imposition of layoff. Thus, the issuance
of layoff guidelines would not only leave plaintiffs better armed to
argue that the perpetuation of prior discrimination via plant senior-
ity violates Title VII, but may well avoid Supreme Court affirmance
of the Third Circuit's decision in Jersey Central and the seventh
circuit's decision in Waters H1.98
194. Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 250 (10th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971); accord, United States v. Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408, 412-13
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); United States v. Local 38, Electrical Workers,
428 F.2d 144, 149-50 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970).
195. Compare Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309, 1318-19 (7th Cir. 1974)
with Watkins v. Local 2369, Steel Workers, 369 F. Supp. 1221, 1227-29 (E.D. La. 1974); and
compare majority opinion in Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Electrical Workers Union 9
F.E.P. Cas. 117 (3d Cir. 1975) with dissenting opinion.
196. N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1975, at 15, cols. 2-3.
197. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965).
197.1. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1974).
198. If, prior to a decision by an appellate court, the law is changed by an administra-
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V. LIABILITY MINIMIZING INITIATIVES OPEN TO EMPLOYERS
In view of the additional occasions for liability that economic
downturn reveals, it must be asked what avenues are open to man-
agement in restructuring a discriminatory seniority system? The
presumptively available remedy of class-wide back pay"' is a power-
ful inducement for management to pursue any avenues that may be
open. The employer whose workforce has not been organized is
free, both in terms of antidiscrimination statutes and prospective
collective-labor strife, to lay off workers who have performed with
demonstrated lesser efficiency. If the lesser efficiency of those laid
off is objectively determined and documented, the decisions will
withstand scrutiny under Title VI. 21 0 The same scenario may be
open to the employer with an organized workforce if the collective
bargaining agreement gives uncertain weight to the consequence of
seniority, and the union, by virtue of weakness or immaturity, has
not succeeded in imposing its unwritten expectations to limit man-
agement's options.
Management, however, will have less prospect for success in
shelving a discriminatory seniority system when strong union oppo-
sition is encountered. 2' Agreeing to a change in the traditional ex-
pectation of insulation from layoff might well prove to be political
suicide for elected officials of the local.
Even the spectre of having to shoulder part of a back pay award
to victims of discrimination may not prompt action from the local. 2°2
Inaction is likely particularly when an impecunious local is in-
volved; the officials of the local could feel that its lack of funds
would dissuade litigants from targeting it or from persisting in ef-
forts to collect a judgment against it. If, on the other hand, the more
tive agency acting pursuant to legislative authorization, the appellate decision will be ren-
dered in light of that change. Thorpe v. Housing Authority of City of Durham, 393 U.S. 281
(1969).
199. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974); Johnson v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974); Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co.,
474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3349 (U.S. Dec. 17, 1974)(No. 74-
389).
200. EEOC Decision No. 75-037, 2 CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (P) 6437 (Oct. 2, 1974).
Caution must, of course, be exercised to assure that determinations as to who is least qualified
are not tainted by unvalidated objective criteria or by prejudiced subjective judgments. The
latter, when reached by white, male supervisors, have been condemned in Brown v. Gaston
County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir. 1972); Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457
F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972); Newman v. Avco Corp., 7 F.E.P. Cas. 385 (M.D. Tenn. 1973).
201. See generally Santo, The Peculiar Problems of a Company with a Labor Union,
in EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPoRTuNrrmS COMPLIANCE 185 (2d ed. P.L.I. 1973).
202. See Rodriguez v. East Tex. Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1974); Carey v.
Greyhound Bus Co., 500 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1974); Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp.,
498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974).
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prosperous international203 or regional conference204 is named as a co-
defendant, prospects of both collection and leverage are enhanced.
Consequently, management is occasionally advised by counsel to
file an employment discrimination charge with the E.E.O.C. nam-
ing unions as respondents when the charge initially filed by an
aggrieved worker fails to do so.
Labor opposition, even threat of strike, is of no avail to manage-
ment in defending the continuance of a seniority system attacked
as discriminatory under Title VII. °5 Continuance of this type of
system has been held not to be attributable to business necessity.
If management cannot be exonerated by the union's opposition
to change in the seniority system, what course must management
follow? At first blush the possibilities seem remote. Seniority is
among those "terms and conditions of employment" that are man-
datory subjects of collective bargaining under the National Labor
Relations Act." Moreover, unilateral changes become unfair labor
practices unless good-faith bargaining on the matter has reached an
impasse. 07 Federal court enforceability of the arbitration clauses of
collective bargaining agreements supplements the NLRA's statu-
tory prohibitions.2'
Federal laws governing labor relations, however, are to be con-
strued so as not to frustrate civil rights legislation. " 'g Out of that
high-level proposition grows a working principle that if, as a result
of an O.F.C.C. review or an E.E.O.C. investigation, particular
changes are designated as prerequisites to compliance, responsive,
unilateral steps may be taken by management without thereby
committing an unfair labor practice2'10 or a breach of contract.,
203. E.g., Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641, 645 (5th Cir. 1974).
204. E.g., Rodriguez v. East Tex. Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1974).
205. "Labor unrest stemming from interference with the "expectations of whites was
found not to amount to a business necessity in United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 2
Cir. 1971, 446 F.2d 652, Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 4 Cir. 1971, 444 F.2d 791, 798-99 and
Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers, 5 Cir. 1969,416 F.2d 989." Rodriguez v. East
Tex. Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 58 n.22 (5th Cir. 1974).
206. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970); NLRB v. Frontier Homes Corp., 371 F.2d 974 (8th Cir.
1967); see NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962). See generally THE DEvELOPING LABoR LAW 406
(C. Morris ed. 1971).
207. See NLRB v. Almeida Bus Lines, Inc., 333 F.2d 729 (1st Cir. 1964); Eddie's Chop
House, Inc., 165 N.L.R.B. 861 (1967); American Laundry Mach. Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1574
(1954).
208. See Textile Workers Union v. Lihcoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
209. United Packinghouse Workers Union v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126, 1133-38 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969); Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12,
24 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
210. In finding that mid-term contract changes in order to comply with equal employ-
ment opportunity legislation after notification to the union would not give rise to an unfair
labor charge, the General Counsel of NLRB commented:
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While the employer's prerogatives in extricating himself from
a position of non-compliance after agency notice thus have been
established, the rules governing employer's efforts to avoid situa-
tions of non-compliance are less clear. The decision in the Savannah
Printing case seems to extend to pre-agency-order situations in its
alternate holding that the employer is to be excused from arbitra-
tion lest he violate Title V][. 212 The recently decided Mansion House
case213 would appear to excuse the NLRA-imposed duty to bargain214
with a union that could be shown to discriminate. Unfortunately,
Board decisions elaborating on the scope of the Mansion House
excusal defy reconciliation.21 5 The Board has been criticized21 1 for its
failure in the Williams Enterprises, Inc. case217 to offer guidance to
an employer seeking to take unilateral action to avoid non-
compliance.
Should the enforcement effort proceed to litigation, injunctive
control is available 218 and has been used to achieve union observance
of a shift in determining seniority.219 A radically different path, how-
"..T. Ihe change effected by the Employer was consistent with the views of a
federal administrative agency having direct responsibility for this subject. The General
Counsel was convinced that the obvious necessity revealed by these facts for accommo-
dating the statutory schemes of the Civil Rights Act and the NLRA in this instance
brought into play the principles of the Supreme Court's decision in Southern Steamship
v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, [62 S. Ct. 886, 86 L.Ed. 1246]." Quarterly Report on Case
Developments, Rep. No. R-1229 (1972) at 4.
EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 365 F. Supp. 1105, 1129-30 n.31 (E.D. Pa. 1973), af'd,
506 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1974).
Similarly, the National Labor Relations Board has adopted the position that where
unilateral changes in collective bargaining agreements are essential to comply with
federal laws, these revisions would not constitute unfair labor practices. Standard Candy
Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1070, 1073 (1964); Southern Transport, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 615, 617-
18 (1963) ....
365 F. Supp. at 1129.
211. Savannah Printing Local 604 v. Union Camp Corp., 350 F. Supp. 632, 636-37 (S.D.
Ga. 1972). But cf. United States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1253 (W.D.N.C.
1972).
212. 350 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Ga. 1972). See discussion of Savannah Printing in Kilberg,
Current Civil Rights Problems in the Collective Bargaining Process: The Bethlehem & AT&T
Experiences, 27 VAD. L. Rxv. 81, 111-12 (1974).
213. NLRB v. Mansion House Center Management Corp., 473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1973)
(en banc).
214. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
215. Grants Furniture Plaza, Inc., 213 N.L.R.B. 80 (1974); Bell & Howell, 213 N.L.R.B.
79 (1974); Williams Enterprises, Inc., 212 N.L.R.B. 132 (1974); Alden Press, Inc., 212
N.L.R.B. 91 (1974); Bekins Moving & Storage, 211 N.L.R.B. 7 (1974).
216. See remarks of Lloyd Sutter before 9th Annual Labor Relations Institute, reported
at 87 LAB. REL. RFP. 292 (1974).
217. 87 L.R.R.M. 1044 (1974).
218. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(h) (1970).
219. United States v. Local 189, Papermakers, 1 E.P.D. 9862 (E.D. La. 1968). Note,
however, the contrasting use of preliminary injunction in Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 349 F. Supp. 3 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
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ever, is open to the employer loath to rely on district court absolu-
tion from the duty to arbitrate or to bargain; he can seek a declara-
tory judgment against the enforcement agencies. Rutgers Law
School Dean Albert Blumrosen, formerly E.E.O.C.'s Director of
Compliance, has been advising lawyers for employers contemplat-
ing layoff to seek such a declaratory judgment, as was done in Jersey
Central.22
220. See note 162 supra; Wall Street J., Nov. 5, 1974, at 27, col. 5.
